THE ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS OF THE FOOD,
DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT
FuDmiuc P. LPE*

As federal regulatory legislation goes, the Food and Drugs Act of x9o6' has left
in its wake an extensive administrative and judicial history. This has made available
much experience as to the effectiveness of the rather wide variety of enforcement
procedures that the Act embodies. The new Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
of 19382 which becomes effective June 25 th, next, perfects and supplements these
procedures in the light of such experience 3
The Basic Procedures. The Act of 19o6 provided three basic judicial and administrative procedures for the enforcement of its prohibitions against the shipment in
interstate or foreign commerce of adulterated or misbranded foods. These procedures were: (i) judicial criminal proceedings with fine or imprisonment as the
penalty; (2) judicial libel for condemnation proceedings with forfeiture and either
destruction, disposition by relabeling or reconditioning, or sale of the articles as the
penalty;- (3) administrative exclusion of imports proceedings with either destruction,
exclusion from domestic commerce, or relabeling or reconditioning as the penalty.
By later, amendment to the Act of x9o6 there was also provided (4) an administrative
4
inspection proceeding covering seafoods.
The foregoing enforcement procedures are retained by the new Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act of 1938, and the first three of them are made applicable to cosmetics
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134 STAT. 768

(igo6), as am'd, 37

416 (x912), 37 STAT. 732 (913), 41 STAT. 271 (1919), 46
49 STAT. 871 (935), 21 U. S. C. §§I-I5.
2Pub. No. 717, 75th Cong., 3d. Ses., approved June 25, 1938, 52 STAT. 1040, 21 U. S. C. A. c. 9
(Supp. r938). (In citations to U. S. Code sections hereinafter, reference to this Supplement will be omitted.)
'One or more of these procedures are common to the Tea Import Act of 1897, 29 STAT. 604, 21
U. S. C. c. 2, the Meat Inspection Act, 34 STAT. 674, 2r U. S. C. §§71-96, the Insecticide Act of 1910, 36
STAT. 335, 7 U. S. C. c. 6, the Naval Stores Act of 1go, 42 STAT. 1435, 7 U. S. C. C. 4, the Federal Im.
port Milk Act of 1927, 44 STAT. 1101, 21 U. S. C. §§141-149, and the Federal Caustic Poison Act of
1927, 44 STAT. 1406, 15 U. S. C. c. is. The Food and Drugs legislation together with these companion
acts constitutes a distinct group from the viewpoint of the development of federal administrative law.
Much of the discussion here of the enforcement procedures of the new Act of 1938 could readily be
applied to other members of this statutory family.
'48 STAT. 1204 (1934), as am'd, 49 STAT. 871 (1935), 21 U. S. C. 5372a.
STAT.

STAT. 1019 (1930), 48 STAT. 1204 (934),
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and therapeutic devices as well as foods and drugs. Further, the new Act contains

a permit system applicable to any class of food that may, by reason of contamination
with micro-organisms during its manufacture, processing, or packing, be injurious
to health, provided the injurious nature cannot be adequately determined after
entrance of the food in interstate commerce. The new Act also provides a special
permit system requiring a manufacturer of any new drug to secure an order of the
Secretary of Agriculture making effective the manufacturer's application for permission to introduce the drug into interstate commerce. The Secretary's order must
be based on findings that the drug is safe for use under the conditions proposed
to be prescribed for its use in its labeling.5 Further, the new Act adds a new court
proceeding for injunctive relief at the instance of the government to restrain certain
violations of the Act. Finally, to facilitate the policing activities of the Food and
Drug Administration, statutory authorization is given by the new Act for the inspection of factories, warehouses, and other establishments,6 and for the copying of
carriers' records showing interstate shipment of food, drugs, or cosmetics and also
the records of persons holding such goods after shipment.1
I. CouLrcMoN OF SAMPLES

Sampling and analysis is a prerequisite in practically all instances to instituting
any of the above proceedings. The procedure for sampling and the limitations
thereon, mostly constitutional in charafter, are of importance to both the government
and the individual.
Under the old Act the power to make regulations for collection and examination
of samples was specifically provided. The new Act makes no such affirmatiVe grant
of power but apparently relies on a more general authority conferred" to conduct
examinations and investigations through officers and employees of the Department
of Agriculture or through state health, food or drug officers or employees duly commissioned by the Secretary of Agriculture as officers of the Department. The Act
then continues9 "where a sample of a food, drug or cosmetic is collected for analysis
under this Act" the Secretary shall, upon request, provide a part of the official sample
for examination or analysis by the owner or any person named on the label of the
article. The statute thereby recognizes the collection and analysis of samples as one
form of examination and investigation and at the same time makes mandatory the
duty of apportioning the official sample-a duty previously recognized only in regulations. However, the statute permits this right to a portion of the official sample to
be restricted by reasonable exceptions and terms and conditions to be prescribed by
the Secretary.9 *
' For further discussion of this provision, which is not treated in this artice, see Cavers, The Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Act of 1938: Its Legislative History and its Substantive Provisions, supra at p. 40, and Hoge,
An Appraisal of the New Drug and Cosmetic Legislation from the Viewpoint of Those Industries, infra
at pp. 119-x2o.
5704, 21 U. S. C. 5374.
S7o2(a), 21 U. S. C. 5372(a).

21 U. S. C. §373S
5703;
5702(b), 21 U. S. C. 5372(b).

' See Regulations for the Enf6rcement of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 3 FE.. R,. 316x, 3170
(Dec. 28, 1938).
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The Sampling Procedures. There are several classes of samples obtained as a
result of several sampling procedures: (i)samples obtained through purchases in the
open market from wholesalers and retailers; (2) "voluntary" samples furnished by
the manufacturer; (3)samples furnished by state health, food or drug officials or
obtained pursuant to "state embargoes" imposed by such officials; (4)samples obtained through libel for condemnation proceedings; (5)samples obtained while
imported goods are held in customs custody pending determination of admissibility;
(6) samples obtained from a producer of goods subject to a permit system, provision
for the taking of such samples being a condition of the permit.
Only the third and fourth classes of samples listed above call for discussion. Recourse to state officials is important where samples neither can be purchased in the
market nor are furnished by the manufacturer, because the Fourth Amendment,
prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures, denies to federal officials power to
take goods without a search warrant, 10 and, under federal statutes, search warrants
can be obtained only if the property to be seized is used in the commission of a
felony." Violations of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act are misdemeanors and
not felonies. 2
The Fourth Amendment, however, is applicable to state officials only when they
are acting primarily in a federal capacity."3 Samples taken by them primarily for the
enforcement of a state act are not subject to the Amendment and may be admitted
as evidence in a proceeding under the Federal Act' 4 even where the applicable state
constitutional or statutory requirements are not complied with.15 In some states,
moreover, state officials are permitted to "embargo," i.e., seize and hold in custody,
pending examination, articles suspected of being adulterated and misbranded,'1 and
articles so seized become accessible to federal officials for sampling purposes.
In libel for condemnation proceedings following the filing of the libel the article
in question is seized by judicial process and thereby comes within the jurisdiction of
" Grau v. U. S., 287 U. S. 124 (1932); Sgro v. U. S., 287 U. S. 206 (1932); Nathanson v. U. S., 290
U. S. 41 (1933).

"There are a few exceptions not relevant here.
' §303(a), 21 U. S. C. §333(a). See p. 77, infra.
'Cf. Garnbino v. U. S., 275 U. S. 310 (1927).

See §702(a), 21 U. S. C. §372(a), for authority to

commission state officials as federal agents.
'Gambino v. U. S., supra note 13. Thus if articles are obtained by the state officials for immediate
use in their state raw enforcement activities and are only subsequently turned over to the federal authorities,
then the articles are admissible as evidence in federal proceedings. Center v. U. S.,267 U. S. 575 (1925);
Schroeder v. U. S., 7 F. (2d) 6o (C. C. A. 2d, 1925). On the other hand, articles are inadmissible as
evidence in federal proceedings if the search and seizure is made by the state officials under the direction
of federal officials, or in their presence, or solely for the purpose of aiding the United States in the enforcement of its laws. Flagg v. U. S., 233 Fed. 481 (C. C. A. 2d, x916) approved in Silverthorne Lumber
Co. v. U. S., 251 U. S.385 (1920); Byars v. U. S.,273 U. S. 2a (1927); Gambino v. U. S., supra. In this
last case the articles seized were. turned over to the federal officials although they were not present at the
search and seizure and the state officiall did not act under their direction. See also the following cases in
the U. S. District Court for the Western District of New York: U. S. v. Bush, 269 Fed. 455 (1920);
In re Schuetz, 299 Fed. 827 (1924); U. S. v. Rossi, x2 F. (2c) 956 (1926); U. S. v. Costanzo, 12 F.
(2d) 259 (1926).
'U. S. v. Capon Water Co., 30 F. (2d) 300 (B. D. Pa. 1929).

"Illinois, for example, has an "embargo" statute of this character. ILL. STAT. AuN. (Callaghan, 1924)
c. 56b, par. 30.
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the court. Either the United States or the claimant may then move that the court

allow through judicial process, the taking of samples of the seized article for the
purpose of analysis and test. Such motions were usually granted under the old Act. '
The new Act,' 8 however, makes it the duty of the court to allow parties representative samples, and in the case of fresh fruits and fresh vegetables, also to require
that there be furnished the claimant a copy of the government analysis that served
as a basis for instituting the proceeding and of the identifying marks of the packages
from which the government prior to the seizure obtained the samples analyzed.
Analyses. The new Act lays down no requirements as to analyses. In the past
these have been prescribed by regulations. Usually they are those recognized in the
United States Pharmacopoeia or National Formulary, or those prescribed by the
Association of Official Agricultural Chemists. If no method has been so recognized
or prescribed, then methods satisfactory to the Secretary of Agriculture are used. The
validity of the tests used may, of course, be questioned in any enforcement proceeding
in the courts.
II. INsTITUTION OF COURT PROCMINGS AND PRELIMINARY HEAIuNG

PreliminaryAdministrative Action and Hearing in Criminal Cases. Under existing administrative practice a field inspector, in case of interstate shipments, forwards
for analysis to the proper field station of the Food and Drug Administration all
samples collected and suspected of being in violation of the Act. The results of the
analysis are sent by the station chief with his recommendations to the chief of the
district. If the district chief approves the recommendations and a criminal prosecution
is contemplated, he instructs the station chief to cite the manufacturer and shipper
of the product and other interested parties to appear at a hearing at the station's
headquarters to present evidence and show cause why the matter should not be
referred to the Department of Justice for prosecution. A record of the hearing and
usually a transcript of the evidence is kept. The respondent is given full opportunity

to explain the situation. Rules of evidence are not followed.
The station chief determines whether, as a result of the hearing, the case should
be placed in permanent abeyance or proceeded with further. In making this determination consideration is given to such factors as seriousness of the violation,
whether the respondent has since the citation changed his product to conform with
the law, whether the violation was malicious or unintentional, whether it is a first
offense, and, in general, whether the respondent has displayed a willingness to abide
' 7 In U. S. v. B. & M. External Remedy Co., 36 F. (2d) 53 (S. D. N. Y. 1929), the obtaining of
samples pursuant to libel proceedings was held not to constitute unreasonable search or seizure or compulsory self-incrimination in violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. The court did, however,
condition its ruling by requiring the government to pay to the owner the value of the samples taken in

case it was not successful in having the goods condemned. The court also imposed the following condition: "Further, I think it proper to require that the claimant be given, samples from the same containers
and that it be permitted to be present at all the tests." This last condition made -the samples of little value
to the government for the presence of the claimant at the tests would result in the government's having

to disclose to him prior to trial the nature of its evidence.
' §304(c), 21 U. S. C. §334(C).
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by the law. The recommendation of the station chief is usually followed, reversals
resulting from administrative policies rather than from a different view of the facts.
The informality of the hearing makes it possible for the record to include any argument on facts or law even though it might tend to defeat the successful prosecution
of the case. Conversely, however, damaging admissions are frequently made by
respondents and, while the statements are not under oath, their repudiation in a
subsequent trial may be embarrassing.
A summary of the findings together with the recommendations are forwarded
to the district chief who may endorse the recommendations as they stand or modify
them. The record is then sent to the chief of the Food and Drug Administration in
Washington, where, if it is decided to prosecute, the matter is referred to the Solicitor
of the Department of Agriculture as to the sufficiency of the evidence. Thereafter,
the case is transmitted by authority of the Secretary of Agriculture to the Department
of Justice for final transmission to the United States Attorney for the proper judicial
district.
The new Act specifically provides 19 that before any violation is reported by the
Secretary of Agriculture to any United States Attorney for the institution of a
criminal proceeding the person against whom the proceeding is contemplated shall
be given appropriate notice and opportunity to present his views, either orally or in
writing, with regard to the contemplated proceeding. By regulation the Secretary has
provided that the "presentation of views.., shall be private and informal." The old
Act also provided for such a hearing although the language was ambiguous and was
construed by some courts as requiring administrative hearings preliminary to libel
for condemnation, as well as criminal, proceedings. 20 Further, the new Act adopts the
administrative construction previously placed on the old Act that the prospective
defendant is entitled to a hearing and not merely the person, such as a bailee, wholesaler, or retailer, from whom the sample is obtained.
Under the old Act the United States Attorney had the duty of instituting criminal
proceedings upon report of any violation by the Secretary of Agriculture. He was
bound to accept the findings of the Secretary and not make any other independent
investigation to satisfy himself. However, the United States Attorney could also
under other general provisions of law, on his own initiative, institute proceedings
irrespective of receipt of any report by the Secretary of a violation. In such event the
statute required no preliminary administrative hearing. 21 The new Act omits the
mandatory duty of the United States Attorney to prosecute at the Secretary's direction. In consequence the District Attorney has discretion in all instances as to
whether criminal proceedings will be instituted. The right to a preliminary administrative hearing still exists only when the Secretary reports the violation and does not
5305,
U. S. C. 5335. For the new regulations on this section, see 3 FED. REo. 365, 362 (Dec.
28, 1938).
'See, e.g., U. S. v. 74 Cases of Grape Juice, 181 Fed. 629 (W. D. N. Y. igiol; aft'd, U. S. V. 20
Cases of Grape Juice, 189 Fed. 331 (C. C. A. 2d, 199s).
'U. S. v. Morgan, 222 U. S. 274 (1911).
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exist when prosecution is instituted by the United States Attorney on his own
initiative. Nevertheless the administrative hearing constitutes a real protection against

unfounded criminal prosecutions in food and drugs cases for it is only rarely that
the United States Attorney institutes such prosecutions otherwise than at the instance
of the Secretary.
According to the Supreme Court, the administrative hearing is not judicial in

character. The parties are not compelled to attend. Any party who does attend is
not in jeopardy, for an adverse finding is not binding against him in any way, but
is merely a preliminary determination. A decision in his favor is not an acquittal in
the sense that it prevents a subsequent hearing before the Department or prevents
22
court proceedings being instituted.
PreliminaryAdministrative Action in Libel Cases. The preliminary administrative procedure in libel for condemnation cases has been similar to that in the criminal
cases except that, as pointed out above, there is no administrative hearing held prior

to the institution of the libel for condemnation proceedings. Also, the Solicitor of the
Department communicates directly with the United States Attorney rather than
through the Department of Justice.
Where even greater speed is necessary, the so-called "direct seizure" procedure is
followed by the Food and Drug Administration. Under this procedure the field
station communicates directly with the United States Attorney for the judicial district
and no prior consideration is given by the district chief or by the Food and Drug
Administration in Washington to the particular contemplated action. The direct
seizure procedure is used where the article is one that rapidly deteriorates or that is

expected to be moved into consumption before the necessary steps could be taken by
way of the Food and Drug Administration in Washington. Such direct seizures,
however, are made only pursuant to definite policies predetermined by the Food and
Drug Administration and sanctioned by the Department of Justice.
Discretion in Institution of Proceedings. Under the administrative practice pursuant to the old Act, libel for condemnation proceedings are instituted in only four
classes of violations: (I) food products containing added poisonous or other added
deleterious ingredients which may be harmful to health; (2) food products consisting
in whole or in part of filthy, decomposed, or putrid animal or vegetable substances,
or any portion of an animal unfit for food, or a product of a diseased animal, or one
that has died otherwise than by slaughter; (3) food or drug products so grossly
adulterated or misbranded with false or fraudulent claims that their distribution
constitutes a serious imposition upon the public; and (4) deliberate frauds in the
shipment of adulterated and misbranded food products that seriously demoralize
legitimate trade practices. Unless a violation falls clearly within one of these four
classes, seizure action is usually not taken, but the party responsible for the violation
is prosecuted criminally. If the violation falls within one of these four classes and
is of a deliberate character both types of action may be taken. There is nothing in
n Ibid.

76

LAw AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

the provisions of the new Act that necessitates a change in the above administrative
practice.
Leaving aside the question of "multiple seizures," the exercise of discretion by
the federal authorities in determining whether to institute criminal or libel for
condemnation proceedings or both is not subject to judicial interference. 23 Further
the new Act2 4 makes specific provision that the Secretary of Agriculture need not
report minor violations for the institution of criminal, libel for condemnation, or
injunction proceedings if he believes the public interest will be adequately served by
a suitable written notice of warning. This provision gives legislative sanction to the
exercise of discretion in instituting proceedings to the end of avoiding trivial or
unnecessary litigation.25
III. CRMINAL PRocEEINGs
ProhibitedActs. The principal prohibitions of the new Act to which criminal and
injunction proceedings apply, are the introduction or delivery for introduction into
interstate commerce of any food, drug, device, or cosmetic that is adulterated or misbranded; the adulteration or misbranding of any such article in such commerce;
and the receipt in such commerce of any article plus the delivery or proffered delivery
thereof for pay or otherwise, except that the recipient may relieve himself of penalties
if the delivery or proffer is made in good faith and on request he furnishes the government with the name and address of the person from whom he purchased or
received the article and copies of all documents pertaining to the delivery. There is
also prohibited the introduction or delivery for introduction into such commerce of
an article if such article is required to be manufactured, processed or packed under
the permit system and no such permit is in force, or such article is a new drug and
no application for its use has become effective. A shipper's guarantee that the article
is not adulterated or misbranded, or was manufactured, processed, or packed under
permit if so required, will also relieve a recipient from penalties for the above basic
violations.
Other less important prohibitions relate to refusal to permit entry and inspection
of factories; copying of records relating to interstate movement of articles; false
guarantees; simulating government marks and other identification devices; revealing of trade secrets by government officers and employees; alteration, mutilation,
destruction, obliteration, or removal-of any label if done while the article is held for
sale after interstate shipment2" and it results in the article being misbranded under
See, as to libel for condemnation cases, Shawnee Milling Co. v. Temple, 179 Fed. 517 (S. D. Iowa
National Remedy Co. v. Hyde, Not. Judg., Food & Drugs, No. 16780 (Sup. Ct. D. C. 1929).
"§3o6, 21 U. S, C. §336.
'H. R. REPs. No. 2139, 7 5 th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938) 5.
"Removal and Alteration of Labels.-To facilitate detection subsequent to interstate shipment of misbranding violations and preserve evidence of such violations, it is necessary that labels on the articles at the
time of interstate shipment shall not be altered or removed prior to the time that the articles reach the
ultimate consumer. This means that the federal regulatory power must protect the articles in situations
that ordinarily would be considered as involving intra-state commerce. It also means that conflicting state
requirements that would necessitate alteration or removal of the federal labels following completion of
interstate shipment, must be held invalid. Appreciating the practical exigencies of such situations the
1go);
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the Act; and specification on the labeling or in any advertising that in application
with respect to the use of a new drug has been approved by the Secretary. The
injunction proceedings are also available to restrain the two minor violations last
mentioned.
Penalties. Under the old Act a violation was subject to a fine of not exceeding
$2oo for the first offense, and for each subsequent offense to a fine of not exceeding
$300 or imprisonment not exceeding one year or both.2 7 The usual penalty imposed
was a small fine. Even for subsequent offenses the imprisonment penalty was rarely
imposed. Because of the smallness of the fines the payment of them amounted to a
small license fee for doing the illegal business. During the fiscal year 1937 fines in
any one case covering one or more violations varied, according to the chief of the
Food and Drug Administration, from sums as low as $i, $2 and $5 to a maximum
actually paid of $i,5oo.oo. Higher fines were imposed in several cases but were
remitted in large part by the courts. Three small sentences imposed in connection
with second offenses were also suspended and the defendants placed on probation.
Under the new Act a first offense without intent to defraud or mislead subjects the
violator to a fine of not more than $iooo or imprisonment of not more than one
year or both, but a second or subsequent offense and a first offense with intent to
defraud or mislead are punishable by a fine of not more than $io,ooo or imprisonment for not more than three years or both. By reason of specific statutory provision
all offenses under the Act remain misdemeanors despite the provisions of the Act
of December 16, i93o,28 which define a felony as an offense punishable by death or
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year and a misdemeanor as all other offenses.
Petty Offenses and Jury Trial. The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution
courts have held that while the states may impose restrictions or require information in addition to what
is required by the federal government, Savage v. Jones, 225 U. S. 501 (1912); Armour & Co. v. North
Dakota, 240 U. S. 510 (i916); Crescent Mfg. Co. v. Wilson, 233 Fed. 282 (N. D. N. Y. 1916); Fougera
v. City of New York, 224 N. Y. 269, 12o N. E. 642 (1gS); Day Borgwall Co. v. State, 19o Wis. 8,
207 N. W. 959 (1926); Royal Baking Powder Co. v. Emerson, 270 Fed. 429 (C. C. A. 8th, 592o), even
where the article remains in the original package up to the time of retail sale, Savage v. Jones, supra,
Standard Stock Food Co. v. Wright, 225 U. S. 540 (1912); Corn Products Refining Co. v. Eddy, 249
U. S. 427 (1919), nevertheless, where the state requirements interfere or conflict with those of the
federal government, they are invalid. Thus a state statute has been declared invalid that required the
removal of a label conforming to federal law and the substitution of a label conforming to state law.
McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U. S. X15 (913); 4. Weigle v. Curtice Bros., 248 U. S. 285 (1919). The
above prohibition in the new Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act relating to the alteration and removal of
labels would seem to write into that Act the rule enunciated in the foregoing cases. The Caustic Poison
Act of 1927, supra note 3, contains a provision with respect to alteration or removal of labels similar to
that in the new Act, but no litigation has arisen with regard thereto. Cf. as to Meat Inspection Act, U. S.
v. Lewis, 235 U. S. 282 (1914), and U. S. v. Green, 137 Fed. 179 (N. D. N. Y. 1905).
'If different kinds of articles are included in one shipment, and each kind is in violation of law,
separate penalties can be imposed. U. S. v. Direct Sales Co., 252 Fed. 882 (W. D. N. Y. 1918). This
cannot be done, however, if the shipment consists of several packages but all of the same kind of article.
U. S. v. Watson-Durand-Kasper Grocery Co., 251 Fed. 310 (D. Kan. 1917). Charges of both misbranding and adulteration for the same act, permissible in some cases, serve to increase the amount of the penalty
that may be imposed. See, e.g., U. S. v. Tilden Co., Not. Judg., Food & Drugs, No. 17325 (S. D. N. Y.
1931).
s46 STAT. 1029. See U. S. v. Chapman, 3 F. Supp. 900 (S. D. Ala. 1931); U. S. v. Venturini, z F.
Supp. 213 (S.D. Ala. 1931).
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requires that the trial of all crimes shall be by jury except in cases of impeachment.
The Supreme Court has, however, repeatedly upheld the rule that despite the
Amendment misdemeanors not involving infamous punishment were petty offenses
and might be tried without a jury if Congress so provides. It would seem to follow
that a proceeding with respect to such an offense would not be a "criminal prosecution" within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment which guarantees the right of
trial by jury in all criminal prosecutions. Congress by the Act of December x6,
193029 has defined petty offenses as those for which the penalty does not exceed confinement in a common jail without hard labor for a period of six months or a fine of
not more than $500 or both. Under the old Food and Drugs Act violations thereof
were held to be petty offenses.3 0 While second offenses were subject to the possibility of punishment by imprisonment, the maximum imprisonment was not over one
year. Therefore the violator could only be sentenced to jail and not a penitentiary,
nor could the sentence be to hard labor. Admitting that Congress could deprive
defendants of the right of jury trial in case of petty offenses, it did not see fit to do so
under either the old Act or the new Act.
Petty Offenses and Informations. The matter of petty offenses also bears on the

question whether prosecution may be instituted by indictment only or by either
indictment or information. The Act of December 16, i93o, not only defined petty
offenses but also provided that all such offenses may be prosecuted upon information
or complaint. It was at first urged that offenses not falling within the Congressional
definition of petty offenses could not be prosecuted by information. Nevertheless
the more drastic penalties would not seem to take the offenses out of the class
of petty offenses, despite the Act of December i6, i93o . It was frequently held that
offenses under the old law could be prosecuted by information.3 1 This rule will
apparently continue for the Supreme Court has taken the view that the provision as
to prosecution by information laid down by Congress in the Act of December 16,
by information of other
i93o, is not exclusive. It does not prevent the prosecution
32
punishment.
infamous
involving
not
misdemeanors
2D46 STAr. 1029.

*'Frank v. U. S., 192 Fed. 864 (C. C. A. 6th, i9ii); Huyler's v. Houston, 4 App. D. . 452 (1914).
'U. S. v. J. Lindsay Wells Co., 186 Fed. 248 (W. D. Tenn. igio); U. S. v. Wells, 225 Fed. 320
(W. D. Tenn. 1913); U. S. v. Weeks, 225 Fed. 1017 (S. D. N. Y. 1912); U. S. v. i,95o Boxes of
Macaroni, x8z Fed. 427 (N. D. 11. i91o).

'Duke v. U. S., 301 U. S. 492 (1937). Prior to the exhaustive restatement of the law by Mr. Justice
Brandeis in Albrecht v. U. S., 273 U. S. 1 (1926), there was much confusion and diversity of practice with
regard to the filing of informations. In this case the Court held that it may be accepted as settled that
leave must be obtained of the court prior to the filing of the information and that before granting such
leave the court must in some way satisfy itself that there is probable cause for the prosecution. Probable
cause for prosecution may be shown by a verification of the information or by annexed affidavits thereto,
or the United States Attorney may file an information under his oath of office, and if he does so, his
official oath may be accepted as sufficient to give verity to allegations of the information. Weeks v. U. S.,
216 Fed. 292 (C. C. A. 2d, 1914).

According to present practice under the Food and Drugs Act of z9o6, the information is made on the
oath of the United States Attorney but is also accompanied by affidavits of the Food and Drug Administra.
tion inspector and analyst who investigated the case, sworn to before a Department official. 43 STAT.
803 (1925).

While affidavits are not the only meaas of satisfying the court that there is probably cause for the
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Venue. Under the Constitution trial is required to be held in the state and district
in which the crime is committed. The most common offense under the new Act, as
under the old Act,38 would be the introduction into interstate commerce of adulterated or misbranded articles. In virtually all cases, therefore, venue would be in
the judicial district from which the articles are shipped.
IV. LIBE. FOR CONDEMNATION PROCEEDINGS

Seizure. Under the libel for condemnation proceedings 8 ' any food, drug, device,
or cosmetic that is adulterated or misbranded when introduced into or while in
interstate commerce or which may not under the permit system be introduced into
interstate commerce, may be proceeded against while in interstate commerce or at
any time thereafter. The essential elements of the procedure are that the article may
be seized pursuant to court process and condemned by the court. The new Act
broadens the scope of the seizure provisions. Under the old Act the article was
required to be adulterated or misbranded at the time of seizure pursuant to court
process.35 Nor could the article be seized after it left interstate commerce but only
so long as it was being transported in such commerce, or, having been transported
therein, remained unloaded or unsold or in the original unbroken package.3 6
Federal law is familiar with two types of seizures. One is seizure not pursuant
to judicial process but made by an executive official (or in some cases a private individual) pursuant to search warrant where necessary, and prior to judicial proceedings.3 7 The other type is seizure pursuant to judicial process as under the federal
food and drugs legislation. A considerable amount of confusion exists as to these
two types of seizure proceedings.38
The category of executive seizures is illustrated by many provisions of the navigation, customs, and revenue laws and the former prohibition laws. These granted the
courts jurisdiction to confiscate or to condemn property previously lawfully seized
by executive officers. In this type of proceeding the seizure by the executive officer
prosecution, the affidavits do become necessary if a warrant of arrest is to issue pursuant to the filing of

the information. The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution declares that the warrant shall issue only
upon probable cause supported by oath. So also the affidavits serve as a basis for the issuance of a
summons without an arrest, which is particularly the practice in prosecutions against corporations.
' The old Act also defined the crime in such manner as to permit venue also in the judicial district
into which the goods were shipped. U. S. v. Alaska Consolidated Canneries, 2 F. (2d) 614 (W. D. Wash.
1924).

" §304, 21 U. S. C. §334.

'U. S. v. Five Boxes of Asafoetida, 181 Fed. 561 (E. D. Pa. igso) holding that article, although misbranded in interstate commerce, may not be seized if labeling corrected prior to seizure.
S§10, 2x U. S. C. 514.
'See,

e.g., The Brig Ann, 9 Cranch 289 (U. S. 1815); The Josefa Segunda, so Wheat. 312 (U. S.

x825); Clifton v. U. S., 4 How. 242 (U. S. 1846); U. S. v. Lariviere, 93 U. S. x88 (1876); U. S. v.
Winchester, 99 U. S. 372 (1878); Coffey v. U. S., 116 U. S. 436 (1886).
'This confusion is well illustrated by the following two cases: Dacufer-Lieberman Brewing Co. v.
U. S., 8 F. (2d) i (C. C. A. 3rd, 1925) and U. S. v. 8 Packages or Casks of Drugs, Not. Judg., Food &
Drugs, No. 697 (D. C. Ohio 19ro). Contra to the first of these cases are U. S. v. 2615 Barrels of Beer,
i F. (ad) 5oo (M. D. Pa. 1924) and Quandt Brewing Co., Inc. v. U. S., 47 F. (2d) '99 (C. C. A. 2d,

r931). Contra to the second case are U. S. v. George Spraul & Co., 185 Fed. 405 (C. C. A. 6th, i9xi);
U. S. V.2 Barrels of Dessicated Eggs, 185 Fed. 302 (D. Minn. 19x1); U. S. v. oo Barrels of Vinegar, 188
Fed. 471 (D. Minn. x9ri); and U. S. v. Capon Water Co., 3o F. (ad) 300 (E. D. Pa. 1929).
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is a necessary prerequisite to court jurisdiction of the confiscation or condmnation
proceedings.
In the case of libel for condemnation proceedings under the food and drugs
legislation the seizure is not a jurisdictional element of the cause. Jurisdiction is
acquired by the court through the filing of the libel in accordance with the usual
admiralty practice. Thereupon judicial process issues for attachment or seizure of
the res. By such seizure pursuant to court process control is obtained over the res but
such control is not a prerequisite to the institution of the libel for condemnation
39
proceeding.
Case at Law and Extent of Admiralty Practice. Similar to the old Act, the new

Act provides that the procedure in libel for condemnation cases shall conform "as
nearly as may be" to the procedure in admiralty except that on demand of either
party any issue of fact joined in any such case shall be tried by jury. This requirement does not give to the federal courts jurisdiction in admiralty in libel for condemnation proceedings. It is only when a seizure is made on the high seas or
navigable waters of the United States that proceedings for forfeiture present a cause
for admiralty or maritime jurisdiction under the general maritime law.40 In no case
does a seizure on land present a case cognizable in admiralty.' 1 Inasmuch as the
enforcement of forfeiture against articles seized on land does not present a case
cognizable in admiralty but a civil suit at common law 42 a jury trial can not be
dispensed with as in admiralty but must be preserved in accordance with the Seventh
Amendment to the Constitution. 43
The question arises as to the extent to which the procedure in the law case is to
conform to admiralty as a result of the statutory requirement that it shall conform
"as nearly as may be." This question was settled in part by the Supreme Court in
the case of 443 Cans of Frozen Egg Products v. United States.4" The admiralty

procedure requirement was there interpreted as extending to the seizure of the
property by process in rem while the appellate review is not by appeal with trial
de nova as in admiralty but by writ of error as at law. The case implies but does
not decide that the nature of the proceedings subsequent to the seizure and prior to
review of the final court order is as at law.
In practice, however, the filing of the libel, the seizure, the intervention of the
claimant, his answer, and all other pleadings until the case is at issue are in accordance with admiralty practice. On the other hand, the trial itself is conducted as an
OU. S. v. Capon Water Co., supra note 38.
mLaVengeancet, 3 Dal. 297 (U. S. 1796); The Schooner Sally,

2

Cranch 406 (U. S. 18o5); The Betsey

and Charlotte, 4 Cranch 443 (U. S. 18o8).

'The Sarah, 8 Wheat. 391 (U. S. x823); U. S. v. Wimchester, 99 U. 9. 372 (x878); Union Insurance
Co. v. U. S., 6 Wall. 759 (U. S. x867); Morris Cotton, 8 Wall. 507 (U. S. z869).
o 443 Cans of Frozen Egg Products v. U. S., 226 U. S. 172 (1912). See to same efect, Lexington
Mill and Elevator Co. v. U. S, 2o Fed. 615 (C. C. A. 8th, 1913); affirmed on other grounds, 232 U. S.
399 (1914); U. S. v. zo Cases, etc., Bred Spred, 49 F. (2d) 87 (C. C. A. 8th, x93).
"The Sarah, 8 wheat. 391 (U. S. 1823); U. S. v. 13o Barrels of Whiskey, 27 Fed. CS. No. 15938
(S. D. Ohio x865); The Queen, 27 Fed. Cas. No. x61o7 and x6io8 (S. D. N. Y. 1870); The J. W.
French, 13 Fed. 9x6 (E. D. Va. x882).
"26 U. S. 172 (1912).
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ordinary trial at law and the rules of evidence governing such trials are applied, but
the judgment is a decree in the form of an admiralty decree. In accordance with the
Supreme Court decision appellate proceedings are as in law cases. Thus, even if the
case is tried without a jury, the review is as in cases at law limited to the consideration of questions of law presented by the record proper independent of special
findings of fact by the trial court.
The Libel and Process. The libel is one of information filed in the office of the
clerk of the United States District Court for the judicial district in which the article
is found. It need not be supported by oath. Process is issued by the clerk of the
court to the marshal as a matter of course upon filing of the libel. The suit being by
the United States no stipulation for costs is a prerequisite. 45 The process is a warrant
of attachment of the property and a monition to all persons interested to appear on
a day certain to show cause why the property should not be condemned:
Release Under Bond. In the usual admiralty proceeding, the property attached
may by court order, even before return of process, be released under bond to the
claimant, upon a money deposit or stipulation with sureties in an amount fixed by
the court. However, libel for condemnation proceedings are not proceedings resulting in a money judgment, but in the condemnation of particular articles. If an article
were proceeded against, for instance, because it is adulterated in that it contains an
added poisonous ingredient, and then were released under bond before trial and
without correction of its adulterated character, its subsequent disposition, while leaving a remedy on the bond to the government by way of a money judgment, would
result in purchasers' obtaining an article which would be fatal or harmful to their
health. In consequence, there is usually no interlocutory release under bond of the
46
article attached.
Claimant. Any person having an interest in the property attached may make
claim thereto by filing notice of appearance prior to the return day together with a
stipulation for costs. If no appearance is made the government may obtain a decree
of condemnation on proof of actual notice to owners of the goods attached or the
person in possession of the goods at the time of attachment and after proof in
addition of the required publication.
Decree and Disposition of Articles. In the event that the condemnation of the

article is decreed, the court may, in its discretion, order the article to be disposed of
Costs and Storage Charges.-Priorto the new Act the Supreme Court seemed to regard the matter
C
of assessing costs and expenses against intervening claimants as governed by admiralty principles. Hipolite
Egg Co. v. U. S., 220 U. S. 45 (191'1). But cf. U. S. v. 559o Cases of Tomato Pulp, 255 Fed. 228 (E. D.
Pa. 1919). The new Act, however, specifically provides that when a decree of condemnation is rendered
against an article, court costs and fees and storage and other proper expenses shall be awarded against
the person, if any, intervening as claimant of the article This new provision settles many uncertainties that
previously existed as to payment of costs and storage expenses.
Claimant's costs in libel for condemnation proceedings can not be adjudged against the United
States even iHthe claimant wins. Charles v. U. S., 183 Fed. 566 (C. C. A. 5th, 19lo); and U. S. v.
French Sardine Co., 8o F. (ad) 325 (C. C. A. 9th, 1935).
" Cf. the unusual circumstances of U. S. v. 408 Bushels of Oysters in the Shell, Not. Judg., Food &
Drugs, No. 4922 (D. N. Y. 1915).
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by government officers by destruction or sale, or by release to the owner on bond for
destruction or sale after being brought into compliance with the Act through relabeling or reconditioning. 47 No sale of a condemned article may be made if the
sale would be in violation of the new Act or the laws of the state in which sold.
The disposition made by the owner of the article must be under the supervision of
an officer or employee designated by the Secretary of Agriculture and the expenses
of such supervision are to be paid by the owner. Under the old law the Food and
Drug Administration has usually opposed any release to the owner for reconditioning and sale if the case is one of adulteration that in the Administration's judgment
cannot be corrected by relabeling or reconditioning as, for example, poisonous or
decomposed foods. 48 If following release to the owner, the article is disposed of in
violation of the conditions of the bond, the bond may be forfeited or the owner
punished for contempt of the court order 40
Multiple Seizures. The most extensive changes made by the new Act in the libel
for condemnation proceedings are those relating to multiple seizures. Multiple seizures present the question whether the government may libel for condemnation a
particular lot when seizure proceedings on a different lot of the same product are
still pending. There is always the possibility of undue hardship on the manufacturer
if he is compelled to defend numerous libel proceedings at the same time in numerous district courts over the country. Thus in the B. & M. External Remedy Case
where twelve such proceedings were pending simultaneously in widely separated
district courts, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia stated that such
prosecutions were unnecessarily oppressive.50
The new Act proposes to meet the multiple seizure situation by providing that
no libel for condemnation proceeding may be instituted for misbranding if another
such proceeding is pending in any court based upon the same alleged misbranding,
and that not more- than one such proceeding shall be instituted if no other such
proceeding is so pending. The limitation'does not apply to adulteration cases, and
further there are broad exceptions that permit multiple seizures if the alleged misbranding has been the basis of a prior judgment in favor of the United States in any
criminal, injunction, or libel for condemnation proceeding, or if the Secretary of
Agriculture has probable cause to believe from the facts found, without hearing,
'"In cases of default condemnation decrees where no claimant appears, the court has occasionally
ordered the distribution of the articles to some charitable institution if the articles are of value and contain
no injurious ingredients, or has turned them over to the Department of Agriculture for experimental
purposes.
'Occasionally the court has refused to release to the owner on bond under other circumstances, as,
for instance, where the article was fraudulently misbranded to represent competing articles of much higher
value to the injury of trade competitors and the claimant has been convicted of similar offenses before and
had numerous other proceedings pending against him. U. S. v. Two Cans of Sweet Birch and Three Cans
of Oil of Gaultheria, 268 Fed. 866 (S. D. N. Y. 1920). For release under bond contrary to the Adminisr
tration's representations, see U. S. v. 1443 Cases, etc., Canned Salmon, 7 F. Supp. 77 (W. D. Wash. 11934).
See, e.g., U. S. v. 40 Barrels of Adulterated and Misbranded Buttermilk, Not. Judg., Food & Drugs,
No. 17, 275 (D. Ore. 593o).
"National Remedy Co. v. Hyde, 50 F. (2d) zo66 (App. D. C. 1935). See also, Hearings before the

Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry on S. 4235, 69 th Cong., ist Sess. (1926) 3.
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that the misbranded article is dangerous to health, or that the labeling is fraudulent,
or that the labeling would in a material respect mislead to the injury or damage of
the purchaser or consumer.
Provision is also made that in situations where the number of libel for condemnation proceedings is limited, the one proceeding instituted may be removed for
trial to any district court agreed upon by stipulation between the parties, or in the
absence of such a stipulation to a district court of reasonable proximity to the claimants principal place of business. Further, in situations where multiple seizures
are permitted, proceedings pending in two or more jurisdictions are required on
application by the claimant to be consolidated for trial. The trial may be had in any
one of the districts where proceedings are pending, to be selected by the claimant, or
in a district agreed upon by stipulation between the parties, or if neither of these
alternatives is adopted, in a district court of reasonable proximity to the claimant's
principal place of business.
Res Judicata. A further problem arises if the government libels a particular lot
of a product, when with respect to a different lot of the same product, the claimant
has either been acquitted in previous criminal proceedings or a decree unfavorable
to the government has been entered in previous libel for condemnation proceedings.
The problem is one as to what constitutes res judicata under the food and drug
legislation.
One of the earliest series of cases typical of this point arose under the Insecticide
Act which contains libel for condemnation provisions similar to those for food and
drugs. In 1917 the government filed a criminal information in the United States
District Court of Nebraska charging the George H. Lee Co., with misbranding a
number of cans of insecticide. The court instructed the jury that the government
must prove that the violation was fraudulent or intentional. The jury then returned
a verdict of not guilty. 5 ' The instructions of the court were clearly in error, yet no
appeal would lie because the case was a criminal one. In 1927 the government filed
a libel for condemnation in a United States District Court for Missouri 2 against
a number of cans of the same insecticide charging that the articles were misbranded.
The George H. Lee Company appeared as claimant and set up in its answer the
judgment in the Nebraska case as a 15ar. The motion of the government to strike out
this portion of the answer was granted. However, when the case was tried it resulted
in a decree in favor of the claimant.
Subsequently, in 1928, the government instituted libel for condemnation proceedings against another consignment of the same insecticide in a United States District
Court in California. 53 The same defense was presented by the claimant who offered
in evidence not only the judgment in the Nebraska case but also the decree in the
Missouri case. The court excluded this evidence on the objection of the government
'U. S. v. George H. Lee Co., Not. Judg., Insecticides, No. 1052 (D. Nebr. 1924).
' U. S. v. 63 Quarts of Lice Killer, Not. Judg., Insecticides, No. zigi (W. D. Mo. 1928).
'U. S. v. 65-3/12 Dozen Quart Size Lee's Lice Killer, Not. Judg., Insecticides, No. 1192 (S.D. Ca.
1go).

84

LAw AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

to its admissibility, and entered the order finding for the government on the mis-

branding charges. On appeal, however, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit reversed the judgment of the lower court, holding that the government was

4
estopped by the judgment and decree in the earlier Nebraska and Missouri cases.5
The only difference between the present case and the earlier cases, according to the
court, was that different shipments were involved. This was not sufficient to prevent
the application of the principle of res judicata.5
If the doctrine of res judicatais applied, the result is that a final decision by any
court adverse to the government's contentions would give the manufacturer of a
particular article the privilege of doing an interstate business in that article free from
molestation thereafter by the government. It means that the government could not
afford to lose a single case brought against an article of food or drugs. It would result
in a substantial increase in the contested cases because manufacturers could afford to
contest many actions brought against their goods in the hope that one of thermt would
return a favorable verdict.
The question also arises as to whether the claimant would be estopped after a
decree of condemnation in favor of the government from asserting in the future that
his goods were not misbranded, and whether all that the government would need
to show in subsequent libel actions would be the prior judgment.
Food and drug cases are often presented to courts not fully informed as to the
nature of the Act and equally as often presented by inexperienced assistants to district
attorneys. Also, the inconsistencies in jury verdicts are notorious. Further, formulas
and therapeutic claims for drugs, for instance, vary from year to year for different
lots of drugs marketed under the same brand name or trademark. A mere change
in prevailing medical opinion would often cause valid therapeutic claims to become
invalid or conversely. There are bound to be variations in any two cases between
the evidence presented and the manner of presentation. These are practical considerations that indicate that the doctrine of res judicata should not be applicable.
"sGeorge H. Lee Co. v. U. S., 41 F. (2d) 460 (C. C. A. 9th, 1930).
MFor similar series of cases, see "Lee's Save the Baby":-U. S. v. Certain Bottles of "Lee's Save the
Baby," 37 F. (2d) 537 (D. Conn. 1929). "Bred Spred": U. S. v. 49-Y/ Cases of Bred Spred, Not.
Judg., Food & Drugs, No. '7351 (E. D. Mich. 1927); U. S. v. x5 Cases of Bred Spred, Raspberry Flavor,
Not. Judg., Food & Drugs, No. 17352 (D. Ind. 1928); U. S. v. so Cases of bred Spred, Not. Judg., Food
& Drugs, No. 18426 (S. D. Iowa 1930); U. S. v. so Cases More or Less of Bred Spred, 49 F. (2d) 87
(C. C. A. 8th, 1931). B. & M. External Remedy: U. S. v. ii Packages of B. & M. External Remedy, Not.
Judg., Food & Drugs, No. 11671 (D. N. H. 1923); U. S. v. 8 Dozen Bottles B. & M. External Remedy,
Not. Judg., Food & Drugs, No. 18176 (various District Courts, 1929-31); National Remedy Co. v. Hyde,
Not. Judg., Food & Drugs, No. 16780 (Sup. Ct. D. C. x929), National Remedy Co. v. Hyde, 50 F. (ad)
xo66 (App. D. C. 1931).
For decision by the Supreme Court involving similar problems in a customs case, see U. S. v. Stone
and Downer Co., 274 U. S. 225 (1927), holding that the doctrine of res judicata is not applicable in the
matter of classification of importations of similar articles; but see Coffee v. U. S., 116 U. S. 436 (z886);
Stone v. U. S., 167 U. S. 178 (897); Murphy v. U. S., 272 U. S. 630 (x926); Aycock v. O'Brien, 28 F.
(2d) 817 (C. C. A. 9th, 1928).
As to cases on estoppel on prior judgment, see Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U. S. 351 (1876);
Bissell v. Spring Valley Township, 124 U. S. 225 (1888); New Orleans v. Citizens Bank, 167 U. S. 371
(x897); Southern Pacific R. R. Co. v. U. S., 168 U. S. 1 (897); Dennison v. U. S., x68 U. S. 241 (1897).
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V. INJUNCTION ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDINGS

A wholly novel enforcement procedure, so far as federal food and drug legislation
is concerned, is provided by the new Act. This is the injunction procedure. 56 Under
it a statutory injunction may be obtained to restrain the principal offenses under the
7
Act and certain of the minor ones as heretofore mentioned.
The objectives sought by Congress in providing for the new procedure are stated
in the report of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce:
This procedure will be particularly advantageous in border-line cases that cannot be settled
without litigation. In many such cases it is unfair to the manufacturer to subject him to
criminal trial and likewise unfair to the public to have the issue determined under the
restrictions necessarily prevailing in criminal procedure. This remedy should reduce litigation. In some cases it should avoid the hardship and expense to litigants in seizure cases.
In many instances seizure is a harsh remedy and should be discouraged or confined to
those cases where the public protection requires such action. In many cases, it is believed
... injunctions can be used with equal effectiveness and with less hardship. A seizure case
finally decided in favor of a defendant leaves him without recourse for his losses, including
court costs, storage, and other charges.58
There is no statutory provision for a jury trial as a part of the injunction proceeding. However, if the injunction is violated the new Act specifically provides that
on demand of the accused a jury trial may be had in the subsequent contempt proceedings. The constitutional validity of a statute that, though permitting the government to substitute injunction for criminal proceedings, depives an individual of a
jury trial with respect to an offense for which a jury trial had theretofore been available, is not wholly clear. The injunction proceedings authorized are analogous to the
common law right of the state to abate and restrain public nuisances through injunction. This public nuisance category has been extended by legislation authorizing
injunction enforcement proceedings for various minor offenses in health and similar
fields without a jury trial being necessary.59 Violations of the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act would seem likely to fall within this category. This is particularly so
since offenses under the Act for the most part can be regarded as petty offenses for
which Congress could even in criminal proceedings, if it chose, deprive the defendant
of a jury trial. That there are limits beyond which Congress may not go in providing
for law enforcement by injunction seems obvious, but the scope to be given to the
constitutional guaranty of a jury trial still remains to be defined.60
VI. EXCLUSION OF IMPORT PROCEEDINGS
The new Act makes no extensive changes in the exclusion of imports proceedings.
The proceedings are wholly administrative and involve no court action although
" §302

21 U. S. C. §332.

The granting of temporary restraining orders without notice and the practice and procedure in case
of contempt proceedings are governed by §§7 and 22 of the Clayton Act, 38 STAT. 737 (194), 28
U. S. C. §381, which are incorporated by reference into the new Act
'H. R. REP. 2139, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938) 3-4.
'See Statutory Extension of Injunction Lau, Enforcement, Note (1932) 45 HAxv. L. REv. zo96. In
recent years the statutory injunction proceedings have also been extensively used by Congress for enforcement of administrative orders in quasi-judicial proceedings without providing for a jury trial.
"'See Simpson, Fifty Years of American Equity (x936) 50 H v. L. REV. 224-227.
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judicial review is possible in collateral injunction proceedings against the appropriate government official 6 ' or in a collateral suit by the government on the importer's bond. The exclusion proceedings require the complementary action of two
departments of the government, the Department of Agriculture and the Treasury
Department. Under the exclusion of import proceedings, articles offered for importation are refused admission if manufactured or processed under unsanitary conditions,
or if forbidden or restricted in sale in the country in which produced' or from which
imported, or if the article is adulterated or misbranded, or is a new drug and no
application for its use has become effective.
Pending determination of the admissibility of an article, it may be released to
the importer under an "entry bond" for the full invoice value of the goods plus the
duty thereon, conditioned on the article's conformity to the requirements of the law
and the return of the shipment to customs custody if demanded. Unless, upon the
investigation of samples of the shipment, a violation is disclosed, a notice of release
is sent to the importer.6 2 Where violation is found, notice is given and an informal
hearing held. If the decision is adverse to the importer, he may appeal-again informally-first to the Chief of the Food and Drug Administration and then to the
Secretary of Agriculture. 3 If the appeal is denied, the shipment is destroyed unless
exported within three months or unless it is released for reconditioning under a
procedure similar to that used in libel for condemnation cases. If the shipment is
not disposed of by one of these methods, action may be brought on the importer's
bond. To avoid forfeiture of the full amount of the bond, such suits are frequently
compromised.
The procedure described above has not been materially altered under the new
64

Act.

Embargoes. The old Act provided for refusal of admission not only if the article
was adulterated or misbranded but also if it was otherwise dangerous to the health
aAmbruster v. Mellon, 41 F. (2d) 430 (App. D. C. 1930). See, for a legislative investigation of the
situation surrounding this case, Administration of the Food and Drugs Act, Hearings before the Senate
Committee on Agriculturi and Forestry, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. (Feb. 12 to June 30, 1930). Usually the
injunction is sought to restrain the government officer from applying an unreasonable standard or test in
ascertaining whether the article is in violation of the applicable Act and from further holding the shipment in customs custody. See Knapp v. Calloway, 52 F. (2d) 476 (S. D. N. Y. 1931) and Knapp v.
Hyde, 5o F. (2d) 272 (S. D. N. Y. 1931). For successful proceedings under the similar exclusion of
import proceedings of the Tea Import Act, see Waite V. Macy, 246 U. S. 6o6 (19x8). C1. Buttfield v.
Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470 (1904), and Sang Lung v. Jackson, 85 Fed. 502 (C. C. N. D. Cal. 1898).
'Releases are of three types: a straight "release without comment" which may be considered by the
importer as a definite determination that future shipments of the same character will not be detained; a
"release without prejudice" if there is doubt as to whether a violation of law is involved but further proceedings are not desired to be instituted, such release indicating that future shipments may be detained on
the basis of further information and subsequent examination; and a "release with warning" which is
issued in those cases in which the article is in violation of law but, by reason of the newness of the
applicable standard or regulation, it seems fair to give warning to the trade before detaining and
excluding from admission shipments offered for importation.
Appeals to the Secretary are rare and are usually, but not always, referred by him to the Cisief of the
Food and Drug Administration.
"In the new Act the "ehtry bond" is described as a "bond as liquidated damages" instead of as a
"penal bond." It is doubted that this will affect the present practice of compromising suits on these bonds.
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of the people of the United States. This health provision in the old law was used as
a basis for certain embargoes imposed by the Food and Drug Administration. Under
these any article of the class embargoed was automatically excluded from importation
following a declaration of embargo by the Secretary of Agriculture. This health

provision has been omitted in the new Act although seemingly the definition of
adulteration under the new Act is sufficiently broad to cover any situation in which
the article has in it any substance, whether or not added, in sufficient quantity to
render the article injurious to health.

The embargo has been used even though seemingly the provisions of the old Act
contemplate refusal of admission only following examination of a particular lot

offered for importation, opportunity for hearing to the importer or owner, and findings by the food and drug officials pursuant to the ordinary exclusion procedure.
For example, in 1927 a typhoid outbreak occurred in and near Montreal, Canada.
More than iooo cases were reported within a short time. Substantial amounts of
milk and cream from this area were customarily imported into the United States.
The Secretary therefore ordered an embargo against milk and cream originating
within this area until such time as the source of the infection was definitely determined and authorities of this government were satisfied that adequate preventative
65
measures had been taken.
No court contest has ever arisen as to the validity of the several embargoes,
probably since the dangerous character of the articles embargoed was not seriously
questioned. 66
VII.

FACTORY INSPECTION AND PERMIT PROCEEDINGS

Factory Inspection. Without specific authority of law, except in the case of seafood, the Food and Drug Administration has maintained under the old Act a voluntary system of inspection of factories in which are manufactured food and drugs for
interstate shipment. Most manufacturers do not object to inspection of their factories,

although their acquiescent attitude may be induced in part by the same considerations mentioned earlier that lead them to furnish "voluntary" samples. Reports of
factory inspections present valuable information as to the likelihood of violations of
the Act occurring with respect to the product of the particular manufacturer in the
event the articles are shipped in interstate commerce. The reports also enable the
Administration to plan its enforcement projects. Factory inspection further enables

the detection of many forms of violation that would be difficult of ascertainment
without such inspection. This is particularly true of foods produced under unsanitary conditions. In many instances it is impossible to determine from a chemical
'Press Release, Dep't Agr., March 28, 1927. This matter could now be dealt with under the later
Milk Import Act, supra note 3.
For other examples of embargo, see absinthe: Food and Drug Inspection No. 147, July 25, 1912;
peyote: S. R. A., Chemistry, No. 13, May 3, 1915, P. 3; cannabis sativa: S. R. A., Chemistry, No. 16,
Jan. 26, 1916, P. 30; beans from India or East Indian colonies: S. R. A., Chemistry, No. 20, July 2, 1917,
p. 62.
" Some of the embargoes perhaps could have been established by action of the President pursuant to
the Act of August 30, 1890, 26 STAT. 415, §4, 21 U. S. C. §18. However, this procedure was not used.
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or bacteriological examination the conditions under which a particular food or
drug was produced. Specific authority for such factory inspection is written into
the new Act.6 7 The inspecting official must make request of the owner, and the
entry and inspection requested must be undertaken at a reasonable time. Refusal
to permit such inspection subjects the owner to a penalty.
Voluntary Seafood Inspection. Under the Meat Inspection Act a similar factory
inspection system, but one including compulsory observance of requirements as to
sanitary conditions for the processing of products for interstate shipment, has been
authorized by law for meat packing plants since 19o6. This Act served as a legislative precedent for writing into the old Food and Drugs Act the amendment of
1934 providing for an inspection system covering seafood.6 8 This inspection system
is in effect a permit system for seafood processors. It is one of the few provisions of
the old Act that is not repealed but is continued in force for the future by the new
Act.
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Investigations by the Food and Drug Administration of shipments of seafood
showed that excessive amounts of seafood, particularly shrimp, were filthy, decomposed, or otherwise unfit for food. Numerous libel for condemnation and criminal
proceedings were instituted and had an injurious effect on the market. In consequence, the industry itself supported a different approach to the problem and
urged the seafood amendment. The difficulties lay in the inability of the packer to
compel the fishermen to adopt proper practices and in the under-processing, lack of
equipment, and lack of packing personnel adequately trained and supervised to
exclude shrimp not fit for food.
Pursuant to the amendment, the inspection system was first' inaugurated for
shrimp packing plants. It is voluntary although a number of inducements are embodied in the amendment and the regulations thereunder to make acceptance of
the system widespread. A packer may apply for inspection for his plant and is
granted it if the plant possesses suitable specified processing equipment and sanitary
facilities. In order to retain the inspection service the packer must also observe
sanitary requirements as to unloading platforms, equipment and plant, and prevention of bacterial spoilage, processes specified for closure of the can, and requirements
as to the time and temperature for processing. A plant for which inspection is being
furnished may not can, handle, or store shrimp that has not been inspected and
approved by the food and drug inspectors. The plant is required to dispose of, for
non-food purposes, shrimp condemned by them as unfit for food. The cost of the
service is paid -by the owner of the plant and amounts to about one-fourth of a
cent per can. Lots of canned shrimp inspected and passed as conforming to the
requirements of the regulations are issued an inspection certificate to that effect, and
the labels thereon are required to bear the legend "Production Supervised by United
States Food and Drug Administration."
§704, 21 U. S. C. 374.
48 STAT. 1204 (934), an'd, 49 STAT. 871 (1935), 21 U. S. C. §372a.
5902(a), 21 U. S. C. §392(a).
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The inspection system is also interwoven with a label approval system. Not only
must the labels bear certain prescribed statements, but they also are required to be
submitted to the Food and Drug Administration for approval. Approval will be
given only if the label is found to conform to the requirements of the Food and
Drugs Act as to misbranding and the like. While there is no direct prohibition
against the use of an unapproved label, failure to submit labels for approval is a
basis for withdrawal of inspection. The use of an unapproved label is also a basis for
denying an inspection certificate. Practically, only approved labels are used. An
approved label may not be used on canned shrimp that has not been inspected unless
destined for export.
While the shrimp inspection service is not a mandatory requirement of law,
practically its use for the shrimp packer has been found advantageous. Unless the
packer avails himself of the inspection service, his product, if shipped in interstate
commerce, is liable to condemnation if found to be unfit for food and the packer is
subject to criminal prosecution. Use of the inspection certificate avoids the likelihood
of such proceedings and the trade losses that result from the attendant publicity.
Also, unless the packer avails himself of the inspection service he is unable to label
his products under the supervision of the government, and as a result sales resistance
is met both from distributors and consumers.
It is contemplated that similar inspection service will be established for salmon
and other seafood, although at a hearing in 1936 spokesmen representing 92% of the
salmon canning industry refused to request inspection.
Compulsory Emergency Permit Control. The new Act 70 adds a further inspection and permit system that has no voluntary aspects. It is applicable to any class
of food that the Secretary finds injurious to health by reason of contamination of
micro-organisms during manufacturing, processing or packing thereof in any locality, provided the Secretary also finds that the injurious nature of such class of food
cannot adequately be determined after the articles have entered interstate commerce.
Such a system would also cover seafood and presumably be applicable to the salmon
industry which has not acquiesced in the voluntary system under the seafood amendment. It would also, of course, apply to many other classes of foods subject to
unsanitary conditions in connection with their preparation.
Following any such finding of the Secretary, manufacturers, processors, or packers
of such class of food are required to obtain permits to which are attached conditions
governing the manufacturing, processing, or packing methods. The system is regarded as a form of emergency control and the permits are required under the Act
only for such temporary periods as may be necessary to protect the public health.
However, the Act does not mention any specific time limit. While the permit system
is in effect no person may introduce or deliver for introduction in interstate commerce any class of food covered by the system unless he has in effect a permit.
Permits may be suspended by the Secretary immediately if any of the conditions
o §404, 21 U. S. C. §344.
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thereof have been violated. No preliminary hearing is required in view of the necessity for prompt action, but the holder may apply for reinstatement and a prompt
hearing on his application therefor. If inspection shows that adequate measures have
been taken to comply with and maintain the conditions of the permit, it is required
to be reinstated. Employees of the Food and Drug Administration duly designated
for the purpose may have access to the factory at all times in order to ascertain
whether or not the conditions of the permit are being complied with and denial of
such access is a ground for suspension of the permit. The compulsory inspection
system under the Meat Inspection Act is closely similar and is apparently constitutionally valid. 71
VIII. PuBLICITY

Notices of Judgment. The new Act provides that the Secretary of Agriculture
shall cause to be published from time to time reports summarizing all judgments,
decrees, and court orders rendered under the Act, including the nature of the charge
and the disposition thereof. 72 This is similar to the provision of the old Act providing for the publication of the so-called notices of judgment. The main purpose served
is that of an additional deterrent to violations of the Act, for in general it may be
said that the publicity resulting from the notices of judgment is frequently superior
in its deterrent effect to that of the penalties imposed. This follows because public
knowledge that the product has been involved in a vi6lation of the law serves to
prejudice it in the eyes of wholesalers and retailers and to some extent the consumers,
and the data contained in the notices of judgment are doubtless made use of by trade
competitors. The validity of the authority granted the Secretary to issue notices of
judgments has never been seriously contested. s
Public Warnings. The new Act also provides 74 for the dissemination of information regarding food, drugs, devices or cosmetics in situations involving, in the opinion
of the Secretary, imminent danger to health or gross deception to consumer. This
authority will permit keeping the public and the trade advised of the results of
investigations made by the Department of particular classes of articles. The provision also gives specific statutory authority for the educational and cooperative work
that the Department has engaged in in the past through public warnings in the form
of press releases. These usually cover types of violations that come to the Food and
Drug Administration's attention and that it expects the trade to correct, or in regard
to which it desires to warn the public for its own protection.
Publicity is an effective part of the administrative machinery of the Food and
Drug Administration and makes it practicable to reduce litigation and use the more
drastic enforcement procedures only for the more flagrant types of violations.
'Pittsburgh Melting Co. v. Totten, 248 U. S. 18 (x918); U. S. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 243 Fed. 441,
450 (D. Conn. 1917).
' §705(a), 21 U. S. C. §375(a).

Ct. Huyler's v. Houston, Vz App. D. C. 452 (1914); Arbuckle v. Blackburn, x13 Fed. 616 (C. C. A.
6th, 1902).
"§7o5(b), §375(b).

